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Tax collection in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
performs poorly, with a tax/GDP ratio of about 
15% –this has severe repercussions for 
service delivery, growth and state-building. 
The ratio in high-income countries is 35%. 
Resource-constrained tax authorities in SSA 
are transitioning towards a new tax era, and 
implementing innovative compliance strategies 
such as ‘tax nudges’ – communication campaigns 
aiming to influence the behaviour of taxpayers. 
Very little quantitative evidence has been 
produced as to why taxpayers in SSA comply 
with or evade taxes. While tax nudge literature 
has boomed in OECD countries and Latin 
America, only a handful of tax nudge studies 
have been produced in SSA. Understanding 
what motivates compliance is crucial, particularly 
for income taxes – for which the incentive to 
evade is higher. SSA countries need to improve 
collection of income taxes, which are preferable 
to indirect taxes in terms of fairness and equity.
Letter experiment
In collaboration with the Eswatini Revenue 
Authority (SRA), this study implemented 
a nationwide randomised controlled trial 
(RCT), nudging more than 20,000 corporate 
and personal income tax payers with letters 
that were tailored by their previous tax filing 
behaviour. This significantly contributes to the 
literature in three ways:
• It is the first of its kind to target three different 
categories of taxpayers at the same time – 
non-filer, nil-filer and active. Most existing 
literature focuses only on active filers. 
Non-filing refers to failure to file a tax return, 
a widespread phenomenon both in Eswatini 
(almost half the registered taxpayers fail to 
file every year) and SSA. Nil-filing consists of 
filing zero income and zero tax liability, which 
happens with about a quarter of income tax 
returns in Eswatini. This means that only a 
third of all registered income taxpayers remit 
a positive tax (actives). This behaviour can 
hide tax avoidance/evasion – it is important 
to consider the three categories together 
when studying tax compliance.
• We tailored the content of letters to each 
taxpayer category – see Table 1 below. 
Non-filers were randomly assigned to 
five types of nudge: (T1) deterrence, (T2) 
educational input on how to file a return, 
(T3) deregistration (educational input on 
how to exit the system), (T4) fiscal exchange 
and (T5) social norms. Nil-filers, fewer in 
number, were assigned to deterrence and 
deregistration nudges. Actives were assigned 
to deterrence and fiscal exchange nudges. 
A smaller group of actives with turnover 
information that diverged from VAT returns 
were only targeted with the deterrence 
nudge. The SRA communicated that it was 
aware of a given taxpayer’s filing behaviour.
• We were able to target both companies 
(20% of the total) and individuals (80%) – 
most studies focus on only one taxpayer 
type. We explored the heterogeneity of 
results along a number of dimensions, 
including past filing behaviour. Thanks to 
a wealth of tax return data, we were able 
to identify so-called perpetual taxpayers – 
taxpayers who have filed in the same way 
since registration. This dimension has rarely 
been studied in the literature.
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Key findings
We group our findings into main and ancillary 
ones. Among the main findings:
• Non-filers significantly respond to the 
nudges, while nil- and active filers do not.
• Non-filers increase filing over the control 
group mean by 2.6 percentage points 
when receiving T1, and 1.3 percentage 
points when receiving T2 or T3. The control 
group filing is quite low – 7% - so the 
magnitudes of impact are relevant. 
• Companies only react significantly to 
deterrence (T1), whereas individuals 
respond to all T1-T5 treatments. 
• Nudges are not effective in pushing 
nil-filers to start filing positively, and have 
the opposite of the intended effect with 
active companies – who are 15% less likely 
to increase tax declared.
There are many ancillary results: 
• Non-filers are more likely to file past 
(2013–2018) returns and to register for the 
e-tax platform. 
• Despite the null effect on tax amounts, 
nudges increase the probability of active 
filers filing positive – preventing some of 
them from falling back into nil-filing. 
• Heterogeneity plays a major role.
• Non-perpetual non-filers react much 
more than perpetual ones, while 
non-perpetual actives increase tax due 
– the negative impact for actives is totally 
driven by perpetuals. 
• Newly-registered taxpayers react less 
than older ones, probably because they 
would benefit from more assistance than 
a one-page letter. 
• Location is important – rural non-filers 
are only influenced by deterrence, while 
urban ones react to all treatments. 
• Company size is relevant. The unintended 
response from active companies is totally 
driven by the largest taxpayers.
Policy recommendations
Based on the causal evidence produced in 
this nationwide RCT, we are able to formulate 
key policy-relevant recommendations. 
• The authority should continue targeting 
non-filers. Pooling all treatments together 
shows that receiving any type of message 
induces a 20-24% increase in filing. 
• The SRA should find more credible 
strategies for nil-filers – who still remain 
a puzzle – and active payers, paying 
attention to the unintended response of 
companies. Active companies enjoy more 
sophisticated accounting services – when 
nudged, they increase their turnover 
but also report more costs, with a zero/
negative effect on their tax liability. 
• Relatedly, our results suggest that the SRA 
should leverage deterrence to improve 
compliance from companies. It could also use 
alternative approaches, based on education 
and morality, when targeting individuals. 
• The SRA should take into account the 
heterogeneity of results when formulating 
its compliance strategy. For example, 
it should put more effort towards those 
taxpayers who have consistently filed in 
the same way since registration. 
• The delivery method could be improved, 
with alternative methods of delivery being 
tried – such as SMS or telephone. Letter 
take-up was 93% for companies, but only 
21% for individuals. This was probably due 
to poor contact information in the taxpayer 
registry – this needs to be kept up-to-date.
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Table 1 Treatment groups
Category T0 
Control
T1 
Deterrence
T2 
Costs
T3 
Deregistration
T4 
Exchange
T5 
Norms
Total
Non-filers 15,266 2,431 2,429 2,424 1,373 1,366 25,289
Nil-filers 1,182 1,162 1,164 3,508
Active 3,607 3,574 3,578 10,759
VAT disc. 477 472 949
